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NEW WINE IN OLD WINESKINS: 
METAPHOR AND LEGAL RESEARCH 
Amy E. Sloan* & Colin Starger** 
And no one puts new wine into old wineskins; otherwise, the wine will 
burst the skins, and the wine is lost, and so are the skins; but one puts new 
wine into fresh wineskins.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Language gives and language takes away.  Words can facilitate our 
thoughts, but so too can they calcify our thinking.  Recall the 1980s critique 
of using male-only pronouns to refer to people generically.  (“When a 
judge decides, he exercises power”; “When a politician wins, he is happy”).  
Feminists argued that this linguistic practice systematically excluded 
women and reinforced suspect patriarchal norms.  Though debates raged 
for years, the critique rightly won the day and transformed our discourse.2  
Today insisting on male-only pronouns seems sexist and as socially 
regressive as referring to African-Americans as “coloreds.” 
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reproduce and distribute copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for educational 
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the 
Notre Dame Law Review Online, and includes this provision in the copyright notice. 
       *    Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law.  Thanks go to Linda Berger, 
Peggy Cooper-Davis, Linda Edwards, Ruth Anne Robbins, and Michael R. Smith for 
comments on earlier drafts and to Nathaniel Shyovitz and Laura Cress for research 
assistance. 
       **   Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law.  Principal, SCOTUS 
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 1  Mark 2:22 (New Revised Standard Version); see also Matthew 9:17. 
 2  See, e.g., ANNE PAUWELS, WOMEN CHANGING LANGUAGE 225 (1998); Judith D. 
Fischer, Framing Gender: Federal Appellate Judges’ Choices About Gender-Neutral 
Language, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 473 (2009).  
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The perils of language become especially acute in the realm of 
metaphor.  Metaphors are inescapable at certain levels of abstraction.3  As 
philosophers have long recognized, we construct our conceptual world 
using metaphors, and we cannot intellectually function without them.4  Yet 
sometimes our concepts are flawed and our metaphors do damage.  
Consider, for example, the War on Drugs.  The policy is a recognized 
disaster—millions have gone to prison, communities have suffered, and 
still our very real drug problems remain unsolved.5  Partial blame for the 
disaster lies with the war metaphor.6  It encouraged a military solution to a 
problem that may need a civilian public health response.7 
This Essay examines a different set of metaphors currently doing 
damage in law.  Though not as life-and-death dramatic as the War on 
Drugs or the struggle against patriarchy, these metaphors affect every law 
student and practicing lawyer.  What’s more, our examination implicates 
broader philosophical issues that resonate well beyond specifically legal 
discourse.  The metaphors we examine pertain to legal research—how we 
conceptualize the task of “finding law” to make arguments and solve legal 
problems.  The broader philosophical issues concern changes wrought by 
technology.  When technology radically alters our material world, 
sometimes our conceptual world fails to adjust.  To successfully evolve, we 
must interrogate and change our deepest metaphors.  This Essay undertakes 
this foundational task in the brave new world of legal research. 
Our interest is both practical and theoretical.  One of us is a research 
scholar.8  While working on a new edition of a research textbook, this 
author unexpectedly struggled to integrate technologies like Google 
Scholar and the latest versions of Westlaw and Lexis into the textbook’s 
framework.  Upon reflection, this author grasped that the framework itself 
was outdated; she needed a different metaphor to explain legal research.  
This left her slack-jawed.  Never before had she realized that metaphors 
framed her very understanding of the research process she otherwise knew 
so intimately. 
 
 3  See infra Part I (explaining the inherent necessary relationship between conceptual 
analysis and metaphor). 
 4  See infra Part I (surveying philosophical and scientific literature on metaphor). 
 5  See Susan Stuart, War as Metaphor and the Rule of Law in Crisis: The Lessons We 
Should Have Learned from the War on Drugs, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 13–14 (2011).  
 6  See id. at 35–41. 
 7  Instead of directing the police to bring overwhelming force into enemy territory, we 
should figure out the causes of the disease of drug addiction and treat them accordingly.  See 
Douglas B. Marlowe, Effective Strategies for Intervening with Drug Abusing Offenders, 47 
VILL. L. REV. 989, 1024 (2002).   
 8  AMY E. SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL RESEARCH: TOOLS AND STRATEGIES (6th ed. 2015) 
[hereinafter SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL RESEARCH]; see also AMY E. SLOAN, RESEARCHING THE 
LAW: FINDING WHAT YOU NEED WHEN YOU NEED IT (2014) [hereinafter SLOAN, 
RESEARCHING THE LAW]. 
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The theoretical stakes of this legal-research-metaphor quest are also 
apparent.  One of us is a jurisprudence scholar.9  After learning about the 
research-metaphor quest, this author was struck by how it flipped an old 
jurisprudential debate.  At the beginning of the twentieth century, the law 
was often characterized as “a seamless web.”10  Then the Realists 
successfully attacked this conception, dooming the law-as-seamless-web 
metaphor.11  Did changes to research mean resurrection of this dead 
metaphor was imminent?  After all, technology has created a new home for 
law on a web.  This web is hyperlinked rather than seamless, but it gives 
the law a radically open and infinitely accessible new form.  The theoretical 
question is whether this new form will also change the law’s fundamental 
nature. 
This Essay argues that conceptualizing emerging legal technologies 
using inherited research metaphors is like pouring new wine in old 
wineskins—it simply doesn’t work.  When a primary challenge of research 
was physically gathering hidden and expensive information, metaphors 
based on journey, acquisition, and excavation helped make sense of the 
research process.  But new, technologically-driven search methods have 
burst those conceptual wineskins.  The Internet and Big Data make 
information cheap and easily accessible.  The old metaphors fail. 
At the same time, technology has not made legal research a self-
executing or self-evident task.  Real and serious challenges remain for 
novice and expert legal researchers alike.  Indeed, now that legal 
information is cheap and abundant, the pressing problem is “information 
overload.”12  We practically drown in search results, and the challenge is 
holding back the floodwaters or just staying afloat.  Choose your metaphor.  
Actually, that is precisely what we do in this Essay.  After examining the 
practical and theoretical dimensions of the problem, we propose to replace 
outdated research metaphors with updated metaphors that can provide the 
fresh wineskin to conceptualize current research challenges. 
 
 9  See, e.g., Colin Starger, Constitutional Law and Rhetoric, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
(forthcoming 2016); Colin Starger, The DNA of an Argument: A Case Study in Legal Logos, 
99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1045 (2009).  Professor Starger’s work on “doctrinal 
mapping” also lies at the intersection of technology and legal research.  See The Supreme 
Court Mapping Project, UNIV. OF BALT. SCH. OF LAW, law.ubalt.edu/faculty/scotus-
mapping/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 6, 2016).  
 10  Ethan Katsh, Law in a Digital World: Computer Networks and Cyberspace, 38 
VILL. L. REV. 403, 403–05 (1993).  This metaphor expressed confidence that all areas of the 
law fit together smoothly in a coherent logical system that evolved according to a rational 
plan.  This epitomized what Grant Gilmore famously called “The Age of Faith.”  GRANT 
GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 41 (1977). 
 11  See Katsh, supra note 10, at 404.  
 12  See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its 
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 442 n.111 (2003) 
(collecting sources on information overload theory). 
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The remainder of this Essay proceeds as follows.  Part I introduces the 
basic tenets and constructs of conceptual metaphor theory.  In Part II, we 
apply this theoretical lens to identify dominant metaphors structuring our 
concepts of legal research.  Part III explains how today’s dominant 
conceptual metaphors have become outdated given technological advances.  
Part IV reimagines one of the traditional metaphors, and then Part V 
proposes new metaphors for legal research.  Finally, we conclude by 
reflecting on how our inquiry into legal research metaphors affects our 
understanding of law itself. 
I.     CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR THEORY 
Most of us learned about metaphor in elementary or middle school.  
Our teachers introduced metaphor as a figure of speech—a simile without 
the “like.”  No longer does this simple understanding suffice.  Metaphor is 
now appreciated as a complex theoretical phenomenon.13  It commands 
serious attention by psychologists, linguists, anthropologists, cognitive 
scientists, philosophers, and even legal theorists.14  The field is vast, and 
metaphor theory comes in many different flavors.  This Essay, however, 
focuses on the variation known as Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT). 
CMT burst onto the scene in 1980 when George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson published Metaphors We Live By.15  In this slim yet profound 
book, Lakoff and Johnson radically reimagined the role metaphor plays in 
language, experience, and understanding.  Where prior theorists had 
regarded metaphor “as characteristic of language alone, a matter of words,” 
Lakoff and Johnson found that “metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not 
just in language but in thought and action.”16  Metaphor was no longer 
conceived as a mere figurative tool to express concepts in language.  
Rather, Lakoff and Johnson showed how metaphor actually constitutes 
concepts and shapes the development of ideas.17  Analysis of metaphor thus 
 
 13  See L. DAVID RITCHIE, METAPHOR (2013) (surveying contemporary metaphor 
theory); see also METAPHOR AND THOUGHT (Andrew Ortony ed., 2d ed. 1979) (presenting an 
interesting survey of pre-contemporary metaphor theory).   
 14  See, e.g., KEN BAAKE, METAPHOR AND KNOWLEDGE: THE CHALLENGES OF WRITING 
SCIENCE 68–71 (2003) (discussing metaphor in science); RITCHIE, supra note 13 (surveying 
metaphor theory in linguistics and psychology).  For explorations of metaphor in the legal 
context, see STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 43–68 
(2001) (discussing metaphor drawing from interdisciplinary fields); David T. Ritchie, The 
Centrality of Metaphor in Legal Analysis and Communication: An Introduction, 58 MERCER 
L. REV. 839, 840 (2007) (introducing entire symposium issue on “Using Metaphor in Legal 
Analysis and Communication”). 
 15  GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980). 
 16  Id. at 3. 
 17  See generally id. 
2016] N E W  W I N E  I N  O L D  W I N E S K I N S  5 
became a tool to understand the deep structure of complex conceptual 
systems. 
Law is obviously a complex conceptual system.  So too is legal 
research.  CMT therefore suggests that metaphor helps us structure, 
comprehend, and navigate these systems.18  More than this, CMT predicts 
that our understanding of legal research will directly affect how we 
conceptualize law.  This is because we actually experience what law is, at 
least in part, through the legal research process.  At least, so goes the 
theory.  To grasp how this sheds light on our practice, we must briefly 
survey the theory’s foundations. 
First, let us define some terms.  Every metaphor involves two 
elements—“topic” and “vehicle.”  The topic is what the metaphor 
describes, and the vehicle is how the metaphor describes the topic.19  
Recall, for example, Forrest Gump’s famous aphorism “life is a box of 
chocolates.”20  “Life” is the topic of Forrest’s metaphor and “box of 
chocolates” is his vehicle.  Box of chocolates explains a way of 
understanding life. 
Next, let us distinguish between “linguistic metaphors” and 
“conceptual metaphors.”  Linguistic metaphors are written or spoken in 
language.  “Life is a box of chocolates” is a linguistic metaphor that 
appeared in the film Forrest Gump.  Conceptual metaphors, by contrast, 
operate at a deep level of consciousness.  Conceptual metaphors help 
“structure what we perceive, how we get around in the world, and how we 
relate to other people.”21  They do not necessarily appear fully formed in 
everyday language, but metaphorical language can provide surface 
evidence of underlying conceptual metaphors.22 
A critical difference between linguistic and conceptual metaphors 
relates to topic and vehicle.  In a linguistic metaphor, the topic is described 
 
 18  See Mark L. Johnson, Mind, Metaphor, Law, 58 MERCER L. REV. 845, 845 (2007) 
(“[C]ognitive science ought to give us insight into the nature of legal concepts and legal 
reasoning.”). 
 19  See RITCHIE, supra note 13, at 10–11.  Other common terms for the “topic” of a 
metaphor include “tenor” or “target.”  A common alternative term for “vehicle” is “basis.”  
Id.  Though not widely accepted, even more evocative terms can be used to refer to topic 
and vehicle: “theme” and “phoros.”  See CHAIM PERELMAN, THE REALM OF RHETORIC 114–
15 (William Kluback trans., 1982). 
 20  The precise quote is “Life is like a box of chocolates.”  Forrest Gump Summary, 
AM. FILM INST. (emphasis added), 
http://www.afi.com/members/catalog/AbbrView.aspx?s=&Movie=55201 (last visited Feb. 
18, 2016).  We have taken poetic license to simplify the illustration.  Similes are really a 
species of metaphor with the same topic/vehicle structure. 
 21  LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 3. 
 22  See id. 
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or explained by the vehicle.  In a conceptual metaphor, the “topic is 
experienced as the vehicle.”23 
If this seems abstract, consider a concrete example.  Lakoff and 
Johnson catalog various conceptual metaphors rooted in spatial orientation 
including HAPPY IS UP and SAD IS DOWN.24  The CMT claim is that our very 
concepts of “happy” and “sad” are partially shaped by our experiences of 
“up” and “down.”25  We see evidence for this claim in common expressions 
such as “I’m feeling up” and “[m]y spirits rose,” as well as in “I’m feeling 
down” and “[m]y spirits sank.”26 
Note how the italicized words in the previous sentence don’t form 
complete linguistic metaphors.  Rather they express underlying 
metaphorical concepts.  Sometimes conceptual metaphors operate so 
deeply that even perceiving surface language as metaphorical presents 
challenges.  Though it seems fair enough to assert that one does not 
literally fall in a depression, one could be forgiven for resisting the notion 
that “cheer up” is metaphorical at all.  Isn’t the phrase just an expression?  
“No,” answers CMT.  It is not coincidence or convention that our language 
has so many phrases that resonate with HAPPY IS UP and SAD IS DOWN.  
Rather, our language reflects a system of concepts shaped by our 
experiences.27 
The CMT account follows from research in psychology, cognitive 
science, and related disciplines and is fundamentally developmental in 
nature.  Lakoff and Johnson regard conceptual metaphors as “embodied,” 
meaning they originate when an abstract topic (say affection) is repeatedly 
experienced through the vehicle of a physical sensation (say warmth).28  
Even before the acquisition of language, certain concepts like AFFECTION IS 
WARMTH become encoded in our basic understanding of the world.  Later 
this concept finds expression in language like “we have a warm 
relationship” or “why are you being so cold to me?” 
CMT does not ground all conceptual metaphors in direct physical 
experience.  However, the most basic embodied concepts—“primary” 
 
 23  RITCHIE, supra note 13, at 68. 
 24  LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 15.  By convention, conceptual metaphors 
are written in large and small capital letters.  We follow that convention in this Essay. 
 25  Id. 
 26  Id. 
 27  See WINTER, supra note 14, at 47 (“[L]anguage is neither entirely arbitrary nor 
merely socially contingent, but grounded in our embodiment and motivated by our 
interactions with the physical and social world.”). 
 28  See RITCHIE, supra note 13, at 69; see also GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, 
PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN 
THOUGHT 77 (1999). 
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metaphors—do form this way in early infancy.29  Vehicles for primary 
metaphors are experiences like “heat and cold, absence and presence” of a 
caregiver, “hunger and thirst, pain and pleasure, eating and drinking, light 
and sound, physical orientation (up/down, front/back), and manipulating 
objects.”30   
These sensory experiences provide the basis for conceptual metaphors 
that express more abstract concepts like love, caring, and need or desire 
in terms of fundamental physiological experiences . . . . In addition to 
LOVE IS PHYSICAL PROXIMITY (and WARMTH), there is also NEED or 
DESIRE IS HUNGER, as in “starved for attention.”31   
Primary metaphors embody simple concepts like AWAKE IS UP (“Get up!” 
“Rise and shine!”) or ASLEEP IS DOWN (“You fell asleep”, “The baby is 
down.”). 
As language and social interaction enter the picture, children develop 
conceptual systems in more and more complicated ways.  Yet metaphor 
continues to structure how these concepts build upon each other.32  Prior 
topics of conceptual metaphors become the vehicles grounding new 
metaphors.  Critically, children (and later adults) still experience these 
vehicles as the basis for new conceptual topics—but the experience is more 
cognitive than sensorial.33  As children grow, their physical-cognitive 
experiences allow them to conceptualize more and more complex 
thoughts—from MORE IS UP to IDEAS ARE OBJECTS to LIFE IS A JOURNEY.  
According to CMT, this concept-building-through-metaphor process never 
ends even though we mature.  It is a fundamental characteristic of how we 
learn and think. 
For purposes of this Essay, this 10,000-foot view of CMT suffices.  
Our modest goal is to identify conceptual metaphors that structure our 
understanding and instincts around legal research and law.  Thus, we don’t 
need detailed explorations of conceptual mapping or cognitive mechanics.34  
 
 29  See Johnson, supra note 18, at 859 (citing Joseph E. Grady et al., Blending and 
Metaphor, in METAPHOR IN COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 101, 101–24 (Gerard J. Steen & 
Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. eds., 1999); Christopher Johnson, Metaphor vs. Conflation in the 
Acquisition of Polysemy: The Case of See, in 152 CULTURAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND 
TYPOLOGICAL ISSUES IN COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS: CURRENT ISSUES IN LINGUISTIC THEORY 
155, 155–69 (Masako K. Hiraga et al. eds., 1997)) (discussing theory of primary metaphors 
drawn on study of metaphor acquisition in young children). 
 30  RITCHIE, supra note 13, at 70. 
 31  Id. 
 32  See Johnson, supra note 18, at 864 (“Once we have primary metaphors, we are off 
and running, so to speak.  Through various types of blending and composition, we develop 
vast coherent systems of metaphorically defined concepts.”). 
 33  See id. at 846.  
 34  See supra notes 28–29.  
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Before moving on, however, we do need to emphasize a final and vital 
theoretical point.  In Lakoff and Johnson’s words: 
     The very systematicity that allows us to comprehend one aspect of a 
concept in terms of another . . . will necessarily hide other aspects of the 
concept.  In allowing us to focus on one aspect of a concept . . . a 
metaphorical concept can keep us from focusing on other aspects of the 
concept that are inconsistent with that metaphor.35 
Lakoff and Johnson call this phenomenon “[h]iding.”36 
Hiding is not necessarily bad.  As we conceptualize and reason, hiding 
can help by reducing distraction and focusing our attention.  However, 
when our conceptual metaphors become outmoded, hiding can inhibit and 
constrain our thinking without our ever realizing it.  In situations where 
conceptual change is needed to catch up with events on the ground, hidden 
metaphors potentially calcify thinking and stifle innovation.37 
II.     OLD WINESKINS: CURRENT RESEARCH METAPHORS 
Although the concept of “legal research” necessarily implicates a 
concept of “law,”38 this Essay confines its primary interrogation of 
conceptual metaphors to those animating our understanding of “legal 
research.”  This limitation on scope is justified because the process of 
research—locating documents that are classified as legal information used 
to accomplish lawyering tasks such as advising clients, litigating cases, and 
engaging in scholarly analysis—is theoretically distinct from the nature of 
law.39  We therefore ask: What are our current primary conceptual 
 
 35  LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 10. 
 36  Id. 
 37  For a familiar example of hiding, consider how male-only pronouns stealthily 
reinforce concepts like POLITICIANS ARE MALE.  
 38  It seems self-evident to us that law is a conceptual metaphor.  Even though law 
exists in the empirical world, “law” cannot be tasted, touched, seen, heard, or smelled.  
Similarly, though we understand law through experience, our experience of law is not 
directly visceral like hunger or directly primal like fear.  Instead, we experience law as a 
concept (more accurately, a family of concepts) built upon other concepts/experiences.  
Given this, CMT teaches that primary metaphors for law will inevitably structure and enable 
more complex secondary metaphors.  
 39  To be precise, legal research depends only on a narrow and circular concept of law 
as “that which can be discovered by legal research.”  In other words, as far as legal research 
is concerned, the only law that matters is the law found through legal research.  While this 
can be said to implicate a rather positivist understanding of law as inherently written-down 
and therefore discoverable, the point is that understanding metaphors for legal research does 
not require a complete understanding of the full metaphorical nature of law in our society.  
For more on how our concepts of research might actually affect our concepts of law (instead 
of the other way around), see infra Conclusion.  
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metaphors for legal research?  How are these metaphors expressed (or 
hidden) in legal research literature? 
The most ubiquitous metaphors in legal research are RESEARCH IS A 
JOURNEY, RESEARCH IS EXCAVATION, and RESEARCH IS ACQUISITION.  
These metaphors originally arose from literal descriptions of the physical 
process of research.  Seeking information, researchers journeyed to a 
library, excavated mountains of text in books, and acquired reams of paper.  
Our current understanding of research remains framed by the conceptual 
metaphors born of this physical experience.  A brief survey of 
representative legal research literature demonstrates how deeply embedded 
these metaphors are. 
Perhaps the most common conceptual metaphor for research is 
RESEARCH IS A JOURNEY.  This concept mainly finds linguistic expression 
through navigation metaphors: following a map; being lost; finding one’s 
way.  The journey metaphor conceptualizes the experience of research as a 
voyage through the unknown fraught with dangers and detours for the 
unwary traveler.  Consider this wonderful example: 
     Early seafarers were justifiably frightened of terra incognita.  Maps 
covered known areas; unknown areas were marked “Here there be 
dragons.”  Perhaps some legal researchers feel similarly.  One of us 
remembers with pain the securities assignment she had as a summer 
associate—she might as well have been sailing without chart or 
compass for all she knew about securities terminology and sources.  
But, happily, researchers seldom need to venture into territory that is 
totally unexplored.  Others have explored most areas of legal research 
and have left behind signposts and maps to guide those who follow.40 
While this passage makes clear that the authors are consciously 
deploying a linguistic metaphor to conceptualize research, many other 
descriptions of research are less explicit, potentially hiding the journey 
metaphor.  Thus, writers refer to researching “the appropriate universe of 
relevant cases” or in “familiar territory.”41 
General advice about research calls on the journey metaphor both in 
describing challenges and proposing solutions to those challenges.  
Research challenges arise when researchers cannot find sources “pointing 
in the right direction.”42  A researcher who feels as if she has “reached a 
 
 40  Peggy Roebuck Jarrett & Mary Whisner, “Here There Be Dragons”: How to Do 
Research in an Area You Know Nothing About, 6 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 
74, 74 (1998) (emphasis added).  Perspectives: Teaching Legal Research and Writing is a 
publication focused on teaching ideas for legal research and writing. 
 41  Jo Anne Durako, Building Confidence and Competence in Legal Research Skills: 
Step by Step, 5 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 87, 91 (1997) (emphasis added). 
 42  Marsha L. Baum, Ten Tips for Moving Beyond the Brick Wall in the Legal 
Research Process, 10 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 20, 20 (2001) (emphasis 
added). 
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dead end and cannot determine the next step to take” may have “reached 
the end of the research trail” and have no need to pursue a “secondary 
route.”43  A common research frustration is feeling as though one has “hit a 
‘brick wall’ . . . and see[s] no other avenue to take.”44  Novice researchers 
are cautioned not to “get sidetracked”45 so that they “avoid getting lost in 
the vast array of information.”46 
Advice about specific research practices similarly incorporates the 
idea that RESEARCH IS A JOURNEY.  For instance, an online table of contents 
may be harder “to navigate” than a print version.  A researcher may have to 
follow multiple steps “to arrive at the desired destination,” increasing the 
chance that he “will lose track of where [he is] along the way.”47  
Conducting case research with a state digest “almost always gets us in the 
right neighborhood.”48  These are just a few examples illustrating the 
ubiquity of the metaphor. 
RESEARCH IS EXCAVATION is a second common conceptual metaphor 
used to describe and understand legal research.  This metaphor finds 
linguistic expression through images of digging: mining for gold or 
precious gems; or “unearth[ing] those fossils of prior disputes that are legal 
opinions.”49  This metaphor captures the notion of searching deeply for 
treasure and conveys a sense of the excitement of discovery: 
     The process of legal research is often compared to a treasure hunt—
the search for that special gem that will bring the researcher wealth 
and happiness if found.  Of course, no treasure hunt will be successful 
unless the students know what they are seeking. . . . Once they 
appreciate the precedential value of primary authorities, then and only 
then can they enjoy the excitement of the hunt and the thrill of the 
find.50 
Most references to excavation are not as direct as the example above.  
Though incorporating the same concept, the actual expression often hides 
 
 43  Id. at 21 (emphasis added). 
 44  Id. at 20 (emphasis added); see also Durako, supra note 41, at 88 (describing “dead 
ends” in research). 
 45  Baum, supra note 42 (emphasis added). 
 46  Id. (emphasis added).  
 47  Patrick Meyer, Think Before You Type: Observations of an Online Researcher, 13 
PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 19, 21 (2004) (emphasis added). 
 48  Judy Meadows & Kay Todd, Our Question—Your Answers, 9 PERSP.: TEACHING 
LEGAL RES. & WRITING 16, 16 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 49  Olivia Farrar & A.G. Harmon, Lawyering Outside Lawsuits: Incorporating 
Negotiations, Settlements, and Mediations into the Legal Writing Curriculum, 19 PERSP.: 
TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 42 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 50  Donald J. Dunn, Why We Should Teach Primary Material First, 8 PERSP.: 
TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 10, 11 (1999) (emphasis added); see also Mary 
Dunnewold, How Many Cases Do I Need?, 10 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 
10, 10 (2001) (discussing precedent “unearthed” in research (emphasis added)). 
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its metaphorical quality.  For example, we “drill down from broader to 
more specific topics.”51  We describe specific sources as “gold mines of 
information.”52  Additionally, images of research results as gems abound.  
An inquiry “nets research gems”53 or “gems of information.”54  Publishers 
“include little gems of information.”55 
The third and final dominant metaphor used today to conceptualize 
legal research is RESEARCH IS ACQUISITION.  The acquisition concept 
concerns collecting materials and reaping the rewards of labor.  This 
concept often surfaces through two sub-metaphors—harvest (gathering the 
fruits of one’s work in the fields) and shopping (buying things from a 
store).  Both sub-metaphors express different aspects of the general concept 
of RESEARCH IS ACQUISITION. 
The harvest motif finds typical expression in an article entitled 
Harvesting Relevant Cases on Lexis and Westlaw: Comparing Results.56  
“Yield”57 is a virtually universal term used to describe research results: 
“Don’t assume that following a headnote from one case in one system will 
yield all the relevant cases.  Use many seed cases.”58  Gathering is another 
consistent image, illustrated by references to “collecting a wide array of 
 
 51  Joanne Dugan, Choosing the Right Tool for Internet Searching: Search Engines vs. 
Directories, 14 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 111, 113 (2006) (emphasis 
added). 
 52  Jarrett & Whisner, supra note 40 (emphasis added). 
 53  Susan King & Ruth Anne Robbins, Creating New Learning Experiences Through 
Collaborations Between Law Librarians and Legal Writing Faculty, 11 PERSP.: TEACHING 
LEGAL RES. & WRITING 110, 112 (2003) (emphasis added). 
 54  Dugan, supra note 51 (emphasis added). 
 55  Ellen M. Callinan, Legal Research and the Summer Job . . . Advice from the Law 
Firm, 7 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 110, 114 (1999) (emphasis added). 
 56  Mary Whisner, Harvesting Relevant Cases on Lexis and Westlaw: Comparing 
Results, 20 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 31 (2011). 
 57  Susan Hanley Kosse & David T. ButleRitchie, Putting One Foot in Front of the 
Other: The Importance of Teaching Text-Based Research Before Exposing Students to 
Computer-Assisted Legal Research, 9 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 69, 69 
(2001) (noting that print and online research yield different information); Ellie Margolis & 
Kristen Murray, Teaching Research Using an Information Literacy Paradigm, 22 PERSP.: 
TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 101, 105 (2014) (noting that, with new search engines, 
“even a poorly constructed search will yield something” (emphasis added)); Steven R. 
Miller, Teaching Advanced Electronic Legal Research for the Modern Practice of Law, 9 
PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 120, 122 (2001) (describing an assignment with 
the goal of forcing “students to think of what resources would yield the text of local 
ordinances” (emphasis added)); Ronald E. Wheeler, Teaching WestlawNext: Next Steps for 
Teachers of Legal Research, 21 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 127, 129 (2013) 
(comparing a search that “yields over 5,000 results from 12 different sources” with one that 
“yields only 51 results” (emphasis added)).  
 58  Whisner, supra note 56, at 31 (emphasis added).  
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resources.”59  Fruit, fruitfulness, and fruitlessness are common themes as 
well.  Lawyers communicate “the fruits of their research.”60  Use of a legal 
dictionary can prevent a “few hours of fruitless research.”61 
By contrast, images of shopping suggest a more urban-focused take on 
the RESEARCH IS ACQUISITION concept.  Harvest contemplates starting from 
something small (a seed) that grows into something larger (fruit).  
Shopping represents choosing from among a selection of pre-stocked items.  
Still, both metaphors reflect the notion of adding through acquisition.  
Loose-leaf services are described as offering “one-stop shopping.”62  Other 
sources may also be described as providing “one-stop-shopping,”63 and the 
idea of research as a consumer shopping experience has been explored 
elsewhere.64 
At their core, excavation and acquisition metaphors both 
conceptualize research as starting with nothing and then expending effort—
in mines, on farms, or in stores—to locate something unique and valuable.  
We note that these metaphors can successfully join with the navigation 
metaphor.  Consider the following description of a student research 
assignment: 
I had resisted the temptation to conduct preliminary research so that I 
knew what students would find and could direct them more easily to 
fruitful paths.  I wanted students to experience the sense of 
disorientation and possibility that comes when a legal professional 
receives an open-ended, collaborative assignment and must, working 
with a group, choose and prioritize research paths.65 
This particular mixing of linguistic metaphors manifests the 
underlying concept of research as journey of acquisition.  It thus helps 
clarify that research is not merely a touristic kind of sightseeing journey.  
Neither is research an exercise in window-shopping.  It is an activity 
 
 59  Debora Person, Using Rule 11 Sanctions to Persuade First-Year Students to Focus 
on Legal Research, 18 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 143, 144 (2010) (emphasis 
added); see also Callinan, supra note 55, at 113 (discussing research strategy built “around 
the information you collect” (emphasis added)). 
 60  Charles Calleros, Traditional Office Memoranda and E-mail Memos, in Practice 
and in the First Semester, 21 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 105, 106 (2013) 
(emphasis added); see also id. at 105 (defining an e-mail memo as a streamlined 
“presentation of legal analysis—or at least the fruits of legal research” (emphasis added)).  
 61  Teresa C. Stanton, Finding Foreign Law: It’s Not Just for the Experts, 16 PERSP.: 
TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 37, 37 (2007) (emphasis added). 
 62  Meadows & Todd, supra note 48, at 17 (emphasis added). 
 63  Stanton, supra note 61, at 39 (emphasis added) (describing the World Legal 
Information Institute (WorldLII) as “practically a one-stop-shopping site”). 
 64  See Amy E. Sloan, Step Right Up: Using Consumer Decision Making Theory to 
Teach Research Process in the Electronic Age, 60 S.C. L. REV. 123 (2008).   
 65  Tom Cobb, Public Interest Research, Collaboration, and the Promise of Wikis, 16 
PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 1, 4–5 (2007) (emphasis added).   
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undertaken to achieve tangible results necessary to complete lawyering 
tasks. 
III.     WINESKINS BURST: WHY CURRENT METAPHORS FAIL 
Do our current metaphors for legal research still conceptualize the 
process accurately?  The short answer to this question is “yes and no.”  To 
understand why, recall that the conceptual metaphors identified above—
RESEARCH IS A JOURNEY, RESEARCH IS EXCAVATION, RESEARCH IS 
ACQUISITION—all have direct origins in physical experience.  To the extent 
that those experiences still have meaning, the traditional metaphors aid our 
understanding.  But to the extent that technology has fundamentally 
changed what research is, the traditional metaphors must give way. 
The journey metaphor once reflected the visceral experience of 
research as physical, linear movement.  Though now a distant memory for 
some, the practice up until the dawn of the twenty-first century required 
researchers literally to journey through labyrinthine stacks to locate 
information.  Even non-print research required physical movement through 
spatially separated destinations.  In the early days, users needed to walk to 
special terminals in the library to conduct online searches.66  Success in this 
environment required mapping out sources that were likely to have useful 
information, plotting a path through the sources in a particular order, and 
trying to avoid detours into irrelevant or out-of-date sources. 
The excavation and acquisition metaphors similarly emerged from 
empirical experience.  A researcher faced with a legal problem began with 
no information—an empty folder in her hands.  She would then gather 
sources (in print and/or online) and “dig” by reading the content.  She 
could “shop” for information with a loose-leaf service bringing together 
multiple authorities in a specific area of the law.  Or she could go to the 
“store” (the library or online) and select from among a range of documents.  
Importantly, such digging and acquiring was expensive both in terms of 
time and money.  Lifting books off library shelves took precious time.  
Making copies of such treasures required money. 
Times have changed. 
Technology has fundamentally altered how we do research.  Trips to 
the library are no longer required for most research tasks.  Spatially, 
information is at our fingertips—accessible through a desktop, a laptop, a 
tablet, or a phone.  We don’t even have to get out of our chairs.  Linear 
movement is no longer required. 
 
 66  For more on the transition from print to online legal research, see generally Carol 
M. Bast & Ransford C. Pyle, Legal Research in the Computer Age: A Paradigm Shift?, 93 
LAW LIBR. J. 285 (2001); Thomas Keefe, Teaching Legal Research from the Inside Out, 97 
LAW LIBR. J. 117 (2005); Theodore A. Potter, A New Twist on an Old Plot: Legal Research 
Is a Strategy, Not a Format, 92 LAW LIBR. J. 287 (2000).   
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Moreover, the foundational knowledge needed for a person to acquire 
legal information has changed.  Research used to require some 
understanding of the hierarchy and structure of the law to select a proper 
source to search.67  Now powerful search engines can search everything at 
once.  These days, almost no physical effort or time is required to identify 
pages and pages of legal content.  Further, text is now hypertext.  We can 
connect documents in myriad individualized ways, not only through pre-
established linear steps.  This has substantially undermined the literal bases 
for the (traditionally understood) journey metaphor. 
Technology has likewise undermined the literal bases for the 
excavation and acquisition metaphors.  The reality of today’s online 
ecosystems means that information is no longer hidden, scarce, or 
expensive to collect.  Information is accessible and plentiful.  Hypertext 
allows us to connect and navigate complex networks of documents with 
ease.  And practically limitless cloud-based storage makes all of this 
information virtually free to save and keep. 
The overriding challenge today is limiting this vast universe of cheap 
results. 
We can use fee-based specialized services like Lexis and Westlaw, 
stripped-down, less expensive services like FastCase, or even completely 
free services like Google that offer large volumes of legal information to 
anyone.68  Yet although potential researchers need not know anything about 
the law or have money to spend before they can acquire legal information, 
research in today’s environment is not necessarily easier or more reliable.  
Content without context is useless.  Information overwhelms us, and we 
struggle to sort what is useful from what is not. 
It is thus apparent that technology has undermined traditional research 
metaphors.  Because key aspects of these metaphors no longer resonate, we 
must both repurpose the traditional metaphors (where possible) and identify 
new metaphors to better facilitate conceptual understanding of the research 
process, as it actually exists today. 
 
 67  This baseline “knowledge of source” applied equally to print sources and early 
online databases.  Though Westlaw and Lexis now use a Google-like search bar, prior 
versions limited searches to particular sources of law. 
 68  The following are just a few examples of websites that provide free access to legal 
information: Legal Information Institute, CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCH., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2016); Caselaw Access Project, THE 
HARVARD LAW SCH. LIBRARY, http://lil.law.harvard.edu/projects/caselaw-access-project 
(last visited Sept. 23, 2016); FREE LAW PROJECT, https://free.law/ (last visited Sept. 15, 
2016); COURT LISTENER, https://www.courtlistener.com/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2016); 
CASETEXT, https://casetext.com/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2016); FINDLAW, 
http://www.findlaw.com/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2016); WIKIPEDIA, 
https://www.wikipedia.org/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2016).  
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IV.     REIMAGINING THE RESEARCH JOURNEY 
Does any conceptual vitality remain in the current metaphors for legal 
research?  Or has technology completely rendered old concepts obsolete?  
In our view, only one traditional metaphor—RESEARCH IS A JOURNEY—
retains appeal, and then only if it is reimagined.  On the other hand, 
RESEARCH IS EXCAVATION and ACQUISITION have been irretrievably 
undermined by technology.  These metaphors now mask more than they 
reveal about the process of research and should be set aside. 
RESEARCH IS A JOURNEY resonates still because research remains a 
voyage of discovery.  Yet the particular type of journey imagined by the 
traditional metaphor no longer represents the actual experience of the 
modern researcher.  In the traditional metaphor, the unplanned journey was 
likened to wandering in the wilderness, sailing without a compass, heading 
out on a trail into open space.69  To overcome these obstacles, the savvy 
researcher knew the importance of picking a very specific path toward her 
destination.  More often than not, this path was linear.  Researchers risked 
getting lost by wandering off trail and venturing into uncharted and 
potentially uninhabited territory. 
Today’s research journey unfolds differently, and so the metaphor 
needs reimagining.  We now look for information in extremely crowded 
landscapes rather than in wild, open spaces.  We don’t traipse on foot 
through unexplored territory so much as inch through congested traffic in 
our cars—or perhaps speed along information superhighways, bypassing 
large swaths of territory instantaneously.  Since hyperlinks have opened up 
countless new routes to our destination, we no longer need to follow a 
single, linear path to get where we want to go.  Nevertheless, we can still 
get lost.  Forget the wilderness; we should now fear the confusion that 
results from wrong turns in frenetic cities with their dense and tangled 
alleyways. 
We thus propose to reimagine our research journey as one through a 
crowded city rather than an open landscape.  This creates new resonance 
for the original metaphor.  Exploring this new city-journey metaphor in 
turn helps us re-conceptualize the challenges of the modern research 
journey. 
Consider first the promise and pitfall of modern legal search engines 
that do not require users to choose a specific source to search.  In one 
sense, typing a legal search without specifying a source resembles plugging 
an address into Google Maps without knowing which city we’re 
navigating.  Google Maps will inevitably pull up something, but we could 
end up far from the place we want to be.70  Similarly, the information 
 
 69  See supra notes 40–48 and accompanying text.  
 70  This basic scenario recently occurred in Iceland after an American tourist mistyped 
a single letter in his Global Positioning System (GPS); he ended up travelling six hours over 
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retrieved by legal search engines can lead us astray if we don’t properly 
understand its context.  Users may be able to conduct searches without 
foundational knowledge of the legal system’s structures and hierarchies, 
but uninformed users risk getting lost in their results. 
Parallels also exist between our understanding of legal-research 
technology and our understanding of physical-navigation devices.  Today’s 
search engines “drive” our research, but those of us who lack advanced 
degrees in computer science cannot fully understand how these search 
algorithms work.71  This may unnerve lawyers who want total control over 
their research, but it is really no different from the way we interact with 
Global Positioning System (GPS) devices.  We enter addresses and follow 
without any clue as to how our smart phones choose the routes they 
suggest.  Our modes of research and navigation both leverage technology 
whose intricacies are beyond our ken. 
Associating RESEARCH IS A JOURNEY with a different kind of trip thus 
infuses the old metaphor with new relevance.  The trip-through-a-crowded-
city reimagining both better reflects our contemporary experience of 
research and improves the metaphor’s potential as a teaching tool.  It is 
therefore worthwhile to bring this metacognition to the metaphor. 
Alas, the RESEARCH IS EXCAVATION and ACQUISITION metaphors are 
not so effectively reimagined.  The fundamental nothing-to-something 
orientation of these metaphors makes them inadequate for conceptualizing 
research in an age of overwhelming information.  In our view, the 
excavation and acquisition metaphors are tightly tethered to the physical 
experience and time and money expenses that old-time research entailed.72  
Instead, we need new metaphors to effectively represent the process of 
narrowing vast quantities of information.73 
 
icy roads to a remote part of the island and became a minor celebrity in the process.  See 
Dan Bilefsky, GPS Mix-Up Brings Wrong Turn, and Celebrity, to an American in Iceland, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/05/world/europe/iceland-
american-tourist-gps.html. 
 71  See Bob Berring, Legal Research Training’s End, SLAW (Oct. 31, 2011), 
http://www.slaw.ca/2011/10/31/legal-research-training%e2%80%99s-end/ (comparing the 
expectation that researchers will understand how today’s legal search engines work to 
expecting drivers to understand how a car’s engine works); see also SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL 
RESEARCH, supra note 8, at 268–79 (discussing variations in search results based on search 
algorithms). 
 72  Though it is theoretically possible to reorient the excavation and harvest metaphors 
to account for the quantities of information that researchers encounter today—imagine 
panning for gold to separate the valuable nuggets from dross; separating the wheat from the 
chaff—these attempts ultimately fall short.  Unlike re-envisioning the journey that research 
represents, repurposing the excavation and acquisition metaphors requires us to focus on 
small subsets of what these literal activities entail and to ignore much of what these 
metaphors represent.  Instead, new metaphors can better capture the idea of filtering 
suggested by “panning for gold” or “separating wheat from chaff.”  
 73  See infra notes 74–81 and accompanying text. 
2016] N E W  W I N E  I N  O L D  W I N E S K I N S  17 
V.     INTRODUCING NEW METAPHORS 
New metaphors for legal research must conceptualize the non-linear 
ways we access and manage overwhelming quantities of information.  At 
the same time, new metaphors should retain those aspects of the traditional 
metaphors that continue to resonate.  We suggest three possible new 
conceptual metaphors that meet these criteria: RESEARCH IS FILTERING, 
RESEARCH IS CONVERSATION, and RESEARCH IS DANCING. 
RESEARCH IS FILTERING avoids the linear and spatial difficulties of the 
traditional journey metaphor without rejecting the concept of learning 
something new.  This metaphor also reverses outmoded notions underlying 
excavation and acquisition because filtering focuses on eliminating 
irrelevant information rather than collecting something from nothing. 
RESEARCH IS FILTERING effectively frames the contemporary process 
of narrowing volumes of legal information down to the subset necessary to 
answer a legal question.  Filtering can take different forms.  Pre-search 
filtering occurs when a researcher selects a jurisdiction before executing a 
search to limit the scope of information retrieved.74  Alternatively (or 
additionally), filtering can occur post-search.  After obtaining information, 
the savvy researcher filters out irrelevant materials to focus on the most 
factually relevant, most authoritative sources.75 
Framing the process this way makes clear that the more effective the 
pre-filtering, the less post-search filtering the researcher will have to do.  
Conversely, less effective pre-filtering (perhaps rooted in the researcher’s 
own lack of prior knowledge about the law at issue) will require additional 
labor through post-search filtering.76  Importantly, the filtering metaphor 
does not suggest that research requires following a rigid series of steps.  
Instead, the metaphor implies a range of choices (some perhaps better than 
others) from which the researcher can choose to filter (either pre- or post-
search) to reduce the quantity of information available to the relevant 
subset.77 
RESEARCH IS CONVERSATION provides a different metaphor that also 
avoids linear imagery while capturing the notions of an abundance of 
information and of learning something new.  In this conception, doing 
research is like going into a room (or entering a chat) with many ongoing 
 
 74  See CYNTHIA F. ADCOCK ET AL., BUILDING ON BEST PRACTICES: TRANSFORMING 
LEGAL EDUCATION IN A CHANGING WORLD 118 (Deborah Maranville et al. eds., 2015); 
SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL RESEARCH, supra note 8, at 37; SLOAN, RESEARCHING THE LAW, supra 
note 8, at 27–33. 
 75  See ADCOCK ET AL., supra note 74, at 118; SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL RESEARCH, supra 
note 8, at 264–65; SLOAN, RESEARCHING THE LAW, supra note 8, at 46–48.  
 76  See ADCOCK ET AL., supra note 74; SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL RESEARCH, supra note 8, 
at 38–41; SLOAN, RESEARCHING THE LAW, supra note 8, at 28, 46–47.   
 77  See ADCOCK ET AL., supra note 74, at 117–19; SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL RESEARCH, 
supra note 8, at 33–41; SLOAN, RESEARCHING THE LAW, supra note 8, at 28–29.  
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conversations.  The researcher must listen carefully to distinguish 
background noise from substantive discussion.  The researcher can do this 
by listening to the most authoritative speakers or those whose conversation 
most closely addresses the subject of the research. 
One particularly appealing aspect of the conversation metaphor is how 
it suggests that researchers will hear many voices.  Expert researchers today 
recognize the potentially immense value of searching beyond primary 
authority and traditional secondary sources.  Technology makes new 
sources available—briefs and other court documents; blogs; information 
posted by law firms, organizations, or individuals; Wikipedia; and crowd-
sourced content such as that provided by CaseText, to name just a few.  
With so many voices offering views on the law, a researcher must listen 
carefully to determine how much attention to give to any given speaker. 
Assessing the credibility and authoritative value of source material has 
long been a foundational skill in legal research, but it is an especially 
important task given the ubiquity of information today.78  By reflecting that 
aspect of research process, the conversation metaphor provides fodder for 
research instruction and an apt frame for further thinking about 
contemporary research challenges and opportunities.  Just as conversation 
invites a participant to listen and speak, today’s environment allows 
researchers to find information and make their findings available to others 
by posting on blogs or participating in crowd-sourced cite-checking 
ventures.79  The conversation metaphor recognizes the interactive and 
social aspects of research process today. 
RESEARCH IS DANCING is a third possible new conceptual metaphor.  
It avoids the linear nature of the navigation metaphor and rightly 
emphasizes research as an iterative process.  Like dancing, research is not a 
regimented march to a predetermined endpoint.  Rather, research involves a 
series of overlapping steps that create a pattern.  Certain basic moves are 
critical, repetition is necessary, but imagination is also important.80  The 
dancing metaphor also frames the way today’s researchers must follow 
links and move from item to item online to identify relevant information—
by incorporating the notion of orderly, yet flexible, movement.  Whereas 
the idea of “jumping” from source to source can seem random or 
disorganized, a dance, while fluid, still has a discernable structure. 
 
 78  See ADCOCK ET AL., supra note 74, at 119 (citing Ellie Margolis & Kristen E. 
Murray, Say Goodbye to the Books: Information Literacy as the New Legal Research 
Paradigm, 38 U. DAYTON L. REV. 117, 131 (2012) (criticizing students’ ability to effectively 
evaluate the weight of authority)).   
 79  See WeCite, CASETEXT, https://casetext.com/about/wecite (last visited Sept. 7, 
2016) (WeCite is a community-sourced citator tool that helps explain relationships between 
various cases.).   
 80  See SLOAN, RESEARCHING THE LAW, supra note 8, at 6–7.  
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The dancing metaphor boasts special resonance in the context of 
teaching research.  If students experience research instruction as dictating a 
rigid series of steps that do not fit with every research situation, they may 
reject their instruction as unrealistic or unhelpful.  Students can also 
experience research as chaotic, feeling as though they found useful 
information by accident rather than design.81  Reframing the process 
through RESEARCH IS DANCING has the potential to inspire greater 
confidence.  By reflecting a flexible yet orderly motion, the dance 
metaphor captures both the skill and the artistry of effective research.  It 
also suggests that with practice and repetition, students can get the swing of 
it. 
Of course, RESEARCH IS FILTERING, RESEARCH IS CONVERSATION, and 
RESEARCH IS DANCING are not the only metaphors that might help us 
conceptualize research.  And neither is any one of these metaphors beyond 
critique.  However, we see these metaphors as fundamentally useful ways 
to reconceive the research landscape in light of changes wrought by 
technology.  Though not perfect, the filtering, conversation, and dancing 
metaphors work in tandem to create a well-rounded understanding of 
research process.  Together, they form new wineskins better suited to hold 
the wine of today’s research process. 
CONCLUSION 
What can our inquiry into legal research metaphors teach us about the 
concept of law?  This Essay has surfaced unwarranted assumptions 
embedded in legal research metaphors; we now suggest that a key 
overlapping metaphor for law is similarly outmoded.  As we have shown, 
the dominant metaphors RESEARCH IS A JOURNEY, RESEARCH IS 
EXCAVATION, and RESEARCH IS ACQUISITION incorrectly conceive of 
research as a linear process where legal information is hidden and scarce.  
This Conclusion argues that the same obsolete assumptions plague an 
overlapping metaphor for law—LAW IS TEXT. 
To unpack this conclusion and its implications, consider first how 
LAW IS TEXT overlaps with metaphors for legal research.  Our explanation 
starts with the observation that legal research typically has “law” as its 
object.  In other words, researchers typically seek “the law” or perhaps “the 
best law for my client.”  This can be expressed as the conceptual metaphor 
LAW IS WHAT LEGAL RESEARCH REVEALS.  Anybody who has ever 
conducted real-world legal research has literally experienced this concept. 
Similarly, anyone who has ever conducted real-world legal research 
has literally experienced the conceptual metaphor LAW IS TEXT because 
“what legal research reveals” is text.  Of course, researchers may call this 
 
 81  Everyone appreciates a lucky break while doing research, but we should never 
teach students that RESEARCH IS A GAMBLE. 
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text a statute, treaty, constitution, opinion, or some other authority.  Yet, 
whether saved online or inscribed in stone, all these sources of law and 
commentary are committed to text.  LAW IS TEXT is thus an essentially 
positivist conceptual metaphor.  It expresses the primary idea that positive 
law is “the Word.”  Given that legal research inherently seeks positive law, 
LAW IS TEXT overlaps conceptually with LAW IS WHAT RESEARCH 
REVEALS. 
This metaphorical overlap has jurisprudential implications for our 
concept of law.  We can draw out these implications in two steps.  First, we 
apply this Essay’s findings regarding outmoded assumptions embedded in 
research metaphors—linearity, obscurity, and scarcity—to the object of 
legal research.  This suggests three metaphors: 
TEXT IS LINEAR 
TEXT IS HIDDEN 
TEXT IS SCARCE 
Then, the second step applies a simple transitive logic.  Because LAW 
IS TEXT, 
∴ LAW IS LINEAR 
∴ LAW IS HIDDEN 
∴ LAW IS SCARCE 
Note that we do not claim that these metaphors for law are either 
“true” or “false.”  Instead, our logic suggests that these assumptions get 
“baked into” our understanding of law at the conceptual level.  Given that 
many lawyers (and law students, professors, judges, and so forth) 
experience what law is through research, the hidden assumptions about 
research get baked into our concept of positive law. 
Now, LAW IS LINEAR, LAW IS HIDDEN, and LAW IS SCARCE do make 
sense when viewed from a historical perspective.  Early law had an 
unquestionably hierarchical nature—it flowed in a line from ruler to ruled.  
Likewise, law clearly evolved as an elite discourse for those privileged few 
who could read and write and access the rarefied world of law books.  The 
literal Word was hidden from most.82  Even today, the law retains the elite 
and mysterious nature suggested by these metaphors.  As a quick example, 
imagine an average person (or lawyer!) reading an impenetrable cell phone 
contract.  This person certainly experiences that LAW IS HIDDEN. 
What about technology?  If technology challenges assumptions in our 
metaphors for research, does technology also challenge our metaphors for 
law?  Now that research is non-linear and information is cheap and easy to 
access, does our concept of law itself need to change? 
Alas, the situation here is complicated.  Our concept of law is not 
univocal—we actually have different concepts of law.  Put another way, 
 
 82  See Amy E. Sloan, The 95 Theses: Legal Research in the Internet Age, 20 J. LEGAL 
WRITING INST. 45 (2015).  
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LAW IS TEXT is hardly the only conceptual metaphor for law in legal 
discourse.  Complications arise because technology has not affected all 
conceptual metaphors equally or at all.  Consider just two alternative 
metaphors (we can imagine more): LAW IS AUTHORITY and LAW IS A GAME.  
While technology may have affected the nature of law’s authority and/or 
the rules of law’s game, it is far beyond the scope of this Essay to 
scrutinize those effects.  We therefore cannot make categorical statements 
about how technology challenges our concept(s) of law.  It is clear, on the 
other hand, that the nature of LAW IS TEXT has changed.  At the very least, 
our concept of positive law should account for this change. 
It is tempting to imagine the change wrought by technology as making 
positive law less rigidly hierarchical, elite, and mysterious.  Now that 
modern research permits non-linear movement through instantly accessible 
legal sources, the text of law itself may “feel” more open.  With legal 
information now freely available, the positive law may seem more 
democratic.  However appealing, these intuitions about technology’s 
impact on our concept of positive law do not accord with experience. 
Recall our hypothetical person struggling to understand a dense cell 
phone contract.  Just because law’s text is now easier to access doesn’t 
mean that it is now easier to understand.  Technology may have opened up 
law’s text to the multitude, but technology alone cannot explain what the 
text says or how it is interpreted by those initiated into the lawyering class.  
As we have shown with research, technology has created problems too.  To 
reiterate an earlier point, content without context is useless.  Abundant, 
cheap information now overwhelms us, and even accomplished lawyers 
struggle to sort what is useful from what is not.  The elite and mysterious 
nature of law persists. 
Nevertheless, we should not be discouraged.  Law may not yet be as 
democratic and open as we would like it to be, but still we can reflect upon 
law to reimagine basic concepts.  Just as we have reoriented metaphors to 
advance our understanding of research, so too can we reimagine law to 
better serve freedom and equality.  Conceptual metaphor theory reminds us 
that we can consciously change our traditions and our ideas.  We can make 
both new wine and new wineskins. 
 
